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The advanced electric power grid is a complex real-time 
system having both Cyber and Physical components. 
While each component may function correctly, 
independently, their composition may yield incorrectness 
due to interference. One specific type of interference is in 
the frequency domain, essentially, violations of the 
Nyquist rate. The challenge is to encode these signal 
processing problem characteristics into a form that can be 
model checked. To verify the correctness of the 
cyber-physical composition using model-checking 
techniques requires that a model be constructed that can 
represent frequency interference. In this paper, 
RT-PROMELA was used to construct the model, which 
was checked in RT-SPIN. In order to reduce the state 
explosion problem, the model was decomposed into 
multiple sub-models, each with a smaller state space that 
can be checked individually, and then the proofs checked 
for noninterference. Cooperation among multiple clock 
variables due to their lack of notion of urgency and their 
asynchronous interactions, are also addressed.  
Type of Submission: Research Paper 
Keywords: Interference, Model Checking, 
Decomposition, Real-time System, Frequency Domain 
Relevant Topics: Formal methods: program analysis, 
model checking, model construction, formal process 
models, noninterference.  Evaluation of software 
products and components: static and dynamic analysis, 
validation and verification. 
 
1. Introduction 
The term Cyber-Physical System (CPS) describes a 
system that is intimately coupled with the physical world 
in space and time and lends itself to hardware/software 
co-design and co-analysis techniques [1][2]. This paper 
discusses the issues in verifying real-time interactions in 
CPSs using model checking techniques, paying particular 
attention to the notion of possible interference among the 
actions of the various components of the system. 
The CPS under consideration is part of a larger project to 
design an advanced electric power grid [3]. This is a 
reliable self-healing grid in which coordinated cyber 
control of power flow control devices plays a significant 
role in the system’s operation. Flexible AC Transmission 
System (FACTS) devices are one such device that is used 
to monitor and adjust the power flows in a power 
transmission system in real-time. The need for better 
controls has been shown many times, among which the 
most serious one is the Northeast blackout 2003 [8]. 
Mitigating the effects of single contingencies (such as line 
failures) is necessary before they cause some combination 
of contingencies which can further lead to a cascading 
failure scenario in which most or all of a power network 
goes down. The advanced electric power grid incorporates 
a number of FACTS devices into a power grid network to 
act as a distributed, fault-tolerant, and real-time 
constrained control system to cooperatively adjust power 
flows.   
Two important issues that arise during verification of a 
CPS include: 1) the interactions among components need 
to be expressed so that the absence of undesired behavior 
(interference) can be verified, and 2) the resulting state 
explosion problem needs to be addressed [4][10].  The 
temporal interactions among system components that may 
cause negative impact are identified and defined during 
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Figure 1. Hardware-in-the-Loop Test-bed 
Within the cyber domain, noninterference is usually 
defined as the absence of race conditions or absence of 
violation of component correctness during the 
composition of system components. To extend this 
concept to the physical domain requires a different line of 
thought. The Nyquist rate1 provides an attractive theory 
that bridges the two domains to relate cyber and physical 
interactions at the Cyber/Physical boundary in terms of 
interference between sampling and system frequency 
response. 
Model checking has been used for the verification of 
hardware and software system designs by specifying a 
model of the system and its desired properties. In this 
paper, a decomposition approach was used to break a 
model into smaller ones. The system is naturally 
partitioned into a number of high-level models. Only a 
subset of the properties is checked for each decomposed 
small model and the resulting proofs are checked for 
noninterference with overall system correctness. The 
decomposed models were verified using RT-SPIN [5], a 
real-time extension of SPIN. RT-SPIN uses 
RT-PROMELA as the modeling language, which 
introduces clock variables for real-time control.  
2. Model Problem: Advanced Electric Power 
Grid - HIL Test-bed 
The specific system treated in this paper is a laboratory 
setup of a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Test-bed of a 
portion of the advanced electric power grid control system 
with FACTS devices [1].  Model checking of 
noninterference among the system components is part of 
the hardware/software co-analysis and co-design of the 
HIL test-bed. As shown in Figure 1, the HIL test-bed 
consists of a real-time simulation of the many lines and 
buses in an electric power grid, connected to several 
physical FACTS devices that interact though a few real 
power lines. The simulation controls the power flow 
through the power line and interacts with it via A/D Input 
and D/A Output; the power line flow is set to that of its 
simulated value. The FACTS devices manipulate the 
power line at a certain update frequency and the harmonic 
                                                        
 
1 The Nyquist rate from signal processing work is the rate 
at which sampling of a frequency-capped physical signal 
such that aliasing does not occur. 
response is bounded by low-pass filters within the device.  
As shown in Figure 2, there are two independent 
interaction loops in the HIL, one between the FACTS 
device and the HIL line, the other between the Simulation 
Engine and the HIL line. Each of the interaction loops 
involves 1) reading the sensor data and 2) applying the 
new calculated settings to the HIL line. Both the FACTS 
device and the Simulation Engine are active components 
in the system and contain their own computers which take 
the sensor readings and calculate the new settings. The 
FACTS device calculates new settings in order to modify 
the power flow while the Simulation Engine takes the 
sensor readings and attempts to calculate the response of 
the entire simulated network and its effects on the current 
HIL line. The HIL line is an actual power line in the lab 
setup which only passively responds to the new settings 
from either the FACTS device or the simulation engine.  
Due to the asynchronous nature, possible interference that 
affects the performance of the HIL Test-bed may exist. 
Between the cyber and physical (power system) 
components, this interference is in the frequency domain 
as follows. The new settings need to be calculated by 
either the FACTS device or the Simulation Engine based 
on the correct reading of the current status of the HIL line. 
In other words, considering that the two interaction loops 
are asynchronous and new settings from either side can be 
applied to the HIL line in real time, it needs to be ensured 
that the sensor reading occurs often enough to capture the 
changes. If the sampling is too slow (infrequent), some 
frequency modes are lost and the Nyquist rate is violated 
– this is defined as interference. 
As shown in Figure 2, there are four properties that need 
to be checked for possible interference: 1) the FACTS 
reading rate vs. the FACTS setting rate, 2) the Simulation 
reading rate vs. the Simulation setting rate, 3) the FACTS 
reading rate vs. the Simulation setting rate, and 4) the 
Simulation reading rate vs. the FACTS setting rate. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model of RT-PROMELA model 
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Figure 3. FACTS-HIL and SimEng-HIL Interactions 
All four properties are used to ensure that the sensor 
reading data from the HIL line used in the calculation of 
new settings contains all of the frequency information 
present. The interactions between reading and setting 
from the FACTS device and the Simulation Engine on the 
same HIL line are illustrated in Figure 3. New settings 
from the FACTS device are applied to the HIL line every 
3.3ms. On the other side, new settings from the 
Simulation Engine to set the power line to its simulated 
value are applied to the HIL line at a much slower 
rate--every 20ms. In order to avoid interference, all four 
rates above need to satisfy the Nyquist rate. 
3. Model Description 
Based on the above understanding of the design as shown 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3, models were developed using 
RT-PROMELA with assertions to formally check the four 
properties by defining processes and clock variables. In 
order to reflect the asynchronous nature of the problem, 
each of the events should have its own timer. Every 
process in the model has a clock variable that works with 
its timer to control its event. 
Initially, one Comprehensive model including all the 
processes and variables was constructed with the hope of 
checking all four properties at the same time. Due to the 
state explosion problem of model checking, the model 
could not be verified using the available computation 
resources. Thus, model decomposition was applied and 
four smaller models were derived from the 
Comprehensive model. They were verified with success. 
The following subsections will introduce the 
implementation details of the Comprehensive model and 
its succeeding decomposition.  
3.1. Comprehensive Model 
During the construction of the Comprehensive model, in 
order to keep track of the various rates, the concepts of 
rendezvous channels and circular buffers were used to 
record reading and setting events (similar to the ideas 
presented in [9]). Each buffer encodes a different 
frequency response through updates by each of the 
different clocks, more entries means a faster clock and so 
on.  Rendezvous channels are used for synchronized 
message passing, which represents how the new settings 
are applied to the HIL line. The occurrence of an event 
can be represented by putting a message on the channel. 
Buffers are used on the HIL line side to receive and 
record the messages. Each of the four events (two reading 
events and two setting events) is assigned one channel 
and one buffer. This notion abstracts Error! Reference 
source not found. the more complex events inside the 
model checker to simple events relating to frequency 
interaction,  
A buffer contains n slots and a pointer moves along the 
slots in the buffer at a certain speed that is no slower than 
the fastest event. Each time the pointer moves to the next 
slot, the newly pointed slot clears its value to zero (0). 
When an event (reading or setting from either the FACTS 
device or the simulation engine) is sent and received 
through the channel, the value in the current slot of the 
corresponding buffer increments by one (1). Otherwise, 
the current slot does not change its value.  
By keeping the window sizes the same across all four 
events, we can count the total values in different sliding 
windows and compare them to make sure that the 
properties are held under Nyquist rate. In order to check 
for interference, a sliding window as shown in Figure 4 is 
used in each of the buffers to count the number of 
executions of an event over the previous m time slots, 
where m is the size of the sliding window. The values in 
the sliding windows are counted periodically, for 
instance, every time the pointer moves to the next slot. In 
order for the Nyquist rate to hold, the count for the sliding 
window of a reading event should be at least twice as 
large as the count for the sliding window of a setting 
event. The Nyquist rate properties are checked by 
comparing the counting values for the four events using 
the following four assertions:  
Assertion 1:  
assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_FACTS_sample); 
Assertion 2:  
assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect<=cnt_SimEng_sample); 
Assertion 3:  
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_FACTS_sample); 
Assertion 4:  
assert(2*cnt_SimEng_update<=cnt_SimEng_sample); 
The reading frequencies for both reading events are 1kHz. 
The FACTS device applies new settings to the HIL line at 
1kHz filtered down to 300Hz. The frequency for the 
Simulation Engine to apply new settings is relatively slow 
(50Hz) because it involves the changes in the generator as 
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well as the programmable load bank. These numbers are 
converted into relative values into the RT-PROMELA 
models and checked with RT-SPIN. The Comprehensive 
model contains the following components:  
Procesess: 
FACTS_S (sampling process of the FACT device) 
FACTS_U (updating process of the FACTS device) 
SimEng_S (sampling process of the simulation 
engine) 
SimEng_U (updating process of the simulation 
engine) 
HIL (the reception process which simulates the HIL 








f_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the FACTS 
device sampling) 
f_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the 
FACTS device updating) 
s_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the 
simulation engine sampling) 
s_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the 
simulation engine updating) 
g_clock (the clock variable that controls the moving 
of buffer pointers) 
Timed automata representing the dynamic behavior and 
interactions among the five processes were used to help 
the construction of the model. The events were governed 
by clock variables and the sensor readings and new 
settings were represented as synchronization points.  
In the model, the sampling and updating events in both 
the FACTS device and the simulation engine are 
separated because they are asynchronous and their 
frequencies are different as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 
3. Each channel is designated to one event, either reading 
or updating, from one of the two active 
components—FACTS device and Simulation Engine. The 
clock variables in RT-PROMELA control the frequencies 
of the events, one clock variable for each event. The HIL 
process does not need a clock variable because it is a 
passive component in the system. All it does is to accept 
the new settings. The g_clock is used to control the speed 
of the buffer pointer and the sliding window pointer. The 
g_clock variable is put inside the HIL process to handle 
the task of updating the values in the buffers and 
managing the pointers movement for the buffers and the 
sliding windows. 
3.2. Model Decomposition 
The Comprehensive model contains five clock variables 
and five processes and we found that the current available 
computing resources were not adequate in verifying the 
Comprehensive model because of the well-known state 
explosion problem in model checking.  
The HIL is comprised of a number of high level 
components. As the models drill down into lower levels, 
for some of the properties to be checked, not all high level 
information is required. This decomposition method 
resembles the traditional abstraction idea [7] and the 
concept of cluster by Basten et al. [6] to a certain extent. 
This decomposition combines with the other methods 
such as symbolic model checking. A model is first 
decomposed to its finest grain—a Decomposed model 
does not contain extra processes, variables, etc. in order to 
verify a subset of properties. The verifications of the 
decomposed models are then combined to imply the 
Decomposed model through the noninterference of 
proofs. 
 
Figure 5. Decomposed Models 
The Comprehensive model is decomposed into smaller 
models as introduced above to alleviate the state 
explosion problem. There are four properties/assertions to 
be checked and each assertion involves the counting 
numbers for two events—one for the sampling of sensor 
data and the other for the updating of HIL settings. Each 
of the four models checks one of the scenarios illustrated 





















(a) FACTS device affecting 
vs. FACTS device sampling 
(b)FACTS device affecting 
vs. Simulation Engine 
sampling 
(c) Simulation Engine 
affecting vs. FACTS device 
sampling 
(d) Simulation Engine 
affecting vs. Simulation 
Engine sampling 
Seventh International Conference on Quality Software (QSIC 2007)
0-7695-3035-4/07 $25.00  © 2007
   
each smaller model will need to include only three 
processes, the sampling process, the updating process, and 
a third one representing the HIL line to receive the 
messages through channels. Three clock variables are 
needed--one for each of the two active processes, and a 
global clock (g_clock) for the control of the buffer and 
sliding window pointers.  
       In order to further simplify the Decomposed 
models, the global clock variable for the management of 
buffer and sliding window pointers can be combined with 
the faster one of the other two clock variables. In each 
Decomposed model, there are two clock variables and 
three processes. For instance, the Decomposed model that 
involves the sensor reading by the FACTS device vs. 
applying the new settings from the FACTS device 
contains the following important components: 
Process: 
FACTS_S (sampling process of the FACT device) 
FACTS_U (updating process of the FACTS device) 
HIL (the reception process which simulates the HIL 






f_s_clock (the clock variable that controls the FACTS 
device sampling and the moving of the buffer 
pointers) 
f_u_clock (the clock variable that controls the 
FACTS device updating) 
Note that the FACTS_S process is in charge of the 
sampling of HIL sensor data and is the faster active 
process. Thus, its clock variable (f_s_clock) also functions 
as the g_clock in the Comprehensive model, which means 
that FACTS_S, in addition to its own task of sending 
sampling event messages, also needs to update the buffer 
and manage the pointers. 
Among the three processes, the FACTS_S process is the 
most complex one because of its extra responsibility of 
controlling the buffer and window pointers as mentioned 
above. The timed automaton for the sampling process is 
shown in Figure 6. The variable QUIT is used to denote 
acceptable end state because of the way clock variables 
work in RT-PROMELA. The variable i is the pointer 
variable for the buffer and j is the pointer variable for the 
sliding window. Code was written following the timed 
automaton in Figure 6 and contains an assertion following 
the completion of counting to check that the sampling 
frequency is at least twice as high as that of the updating 
process. 
 
Figure 6. Timed Automaton: FACTS Device Sampling 
Each of the models directly verifies one of the assertions 
(1-4) as indicated by (V) in Table 1. However, since the 
models are verified independently, there is the possibility 
that the individual verifications do not imply correctness 
of the Comprehensive model. These possibilities are 
indicated by (X). 
To show that the assumptions made by the verification of 
the Decomposed Models do not violate the correctness of 
the Comprehensive Model, we turn, again, to showing 
noninterference now, solely, in the cyber domain, 
manually, using the techniques of Owicki and Gries [11]. 
Lemma 1: The verification of Model a with Assertion 1 
does not interfere with the correctness of Assertion 2. 
Proof: Using the definition of noninterference where a is 
an action and assertion is an assertion of interest, we must 
show: 
{pre(a) AND assertion} action a {assertion} 
For the Comprehensive Model 
{pre(Model a) AND Assertion 2} Model a {Assertion 2} 
Since Assertion 1 is invariant (by the mechanical 
verification) over Model a, we have: 
{(Assertion 1: 2*cnt_FACTS_affect <= 
cnt_FACTS_sample) 
AND Assertion 2: assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect <=  
cnt_SimEng_sample)} 
Model a {Assertion2: assert(2*cnt_FACTS_affect 
<= cnt_SimEng_sample)} 
Since the clocks and sample rate among all four models 
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are fixed, Model a’s actions can be considered as 
assignments  
cnt_FACTS_sample = 1000 
cnt_FACTS_affect = 300 
With the following implication, the assignment axiom 
holds,  
{2*300<=1000) AND (2*300<=cnt_SimEng_sample)}  
⇒ (2*300<=cnt_SimEng_sample)} 
As long as Model b and Model d hold 
cnt_SimEng_sample constant, the implication remains 
true.  
Theorem 1: The individual verifications of Models a-d 
compose to show the Comprehensive Model. 
Proof: The remainder of the proofs of individual 
noninterference are symmetric to those of Lemma 1. 
Since each of Assertions 1-4 remain invariant over Model 
a-d executions, the conjunction of Assertions 1-4 remains 
invariant over the model executions.  
 
Table 1. Assertions affected by Models 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d 
Assertion 1 V X X  
Assertion 2 X V  X 
Assertion 3 X  V X 
Assertion 4  X X V 
 












FS_FU 8 6 574011 2.7551 1.9112 
FS_SU 10 8 904673 2.4003 10.977 
SS_FU 8 6 574011 2.7551 1.9112 
SS_SU 12 10 12817057 3.0549 23.623 
 
 
3.3. Other Issues 
The clock variables in RT-PROMELA have no notion of 
urgency. The laziness prevents the triggering of an event 
before the clock guard is removed. However, if some 
other transition is taking place while the clock guard is 
removed, the chance for the event to be triggered is 
missed. This laziness problem comes from 
RT-PROMELA and will affect the model to be checked.  
To avoid such a problem, this model also checked for the 
condition of missing a clock guard. If this happens, the 
model goes to an acceptable end state, denoted by the 
variable QUIT. This is shown in the timed automaton 
(Figure 6). If the value of the clock variable f_s_clock 
exceeds the clock guard f_s_timer, the model sets QUIT 
to one (1) and goes to an end state. This QUIT is a global 
variable and the other processes can check its value. 
When the other processes find the value of one (1) in 
QUIT, they also go to the acceptable end state. This will 
early-terminate some of the execution branches during the 
model checking. These acceptable end states are not a 
problem with the model but are to avoid the unfavorable 
effects brought by the laziness of clock variables in 
RT-PROMELA. Excluding the paths with these 
acceptable end states will not affect the model checking 
result. If the other execution paths all satisfy the asserted 
properties, the model is said to be verified. Otherwise, 
assertion violation is alerted.  
Another issue comes from the way different processes 
work asynchronously. Because the message recording and 
the movement of buffer pointers are not synchronized 
(and this is the desired simulation of the reality), it is 
possible for two messages to be recorded in the same time 
slot and leaving one slot empty either before or after the 
double recording. In this experiment, in order to check the 
frequency properties, the assertions are modified by 
introducing an offset of one (1). Thus, the following 






4. Model Verification  
The Decomposed models were verified using RT-SPIN 
on the Linux server at Peking University. This server was 
equipped with 64-bit Power5 microprocessors from IBM 
and 12 gigabytes of memory. The results showed that 
based on the current values in the system, no interference 
was introduced. Table 2 lists the numbers of depth 
reached and the amount of memory usage (in Bytes) for 
each of the four Decomposed models. These experiments 
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used the relative timer values based on the numbers in 
Figure 2. The sampling timers on the FACTS device side 
and the Simulation Engine side were both set to 6; the 
timer for updating from the FACTS device was set to 20; 
and the timer for the updating from the Simulation Engine 
was set to 120.  
The reason to use different buffer and window sizes in 
different experiments as shown in Table 2 was to find out 
their effects on the resource usage. These values showed 
that due to the existence of the state explosion problem, 
the depth and memory usage grow much faster than the 
buffer and window size grow. For instance, between the 
Decomposed models of SS_SU and FS_SU, the sampling 
frequencies (SS and FS) were kept the same and the 
updating processes were identical. When the buffer size 
was increased from 10 to 12 and the window size was 
increased from 8 to 10, the memory usage almost 
doubled. The number of depth reached and the number of 
states explored both increased by more than 10 times. 
In order to validate the model checking, the timer values 
were changed to see the effects to the model. For instance, 
if the reading frequency of the FACTS device is lowered 
to less than 600Hz, caused by possible scheduling 
violation, the Nyquist rate should be violated and possible 
incorrect readings will cause inaccurate new settings 
In response to this scenario, the timer variable for the 
FACTS reading event was raised from 6 to values above 
the threshold of 8, such as 10 or 15. As a result, the two 
models involving the FACTS reading process (FS_SU 
and FS_SU) reported assertion violation. More similar 
value adjustments were made in the models and the 
results were all correct.  
5. Conclusion 
The advanced electric power grid is a complex real-time 
system. Thus, the temporal interactions among 
components need to be carefully examined and verified to 
avoid interference among them. This paper introduced a 
successful application of model checking on real-time 
interference properties using RT-SPIN. The major issue 
addressed in the experiment is one type of 
frequency-based interference and the verification of the 
absence of such interference in the system using model 
checking. Some other issues related to the asynchronous 
interactions and modeling language were also discussed, 
such as the decomposition of the model and the lack of 
urgency in clock variables in RT-PROMELA.   
Model decomposition is one of many ways to tackle the 
state explosion problem in model checking. In this 
experiment, the Comprehensive model was decomposed 
into smaller sub-models. Memory usage was reduced at 
the cost of more models to be checked. This served our 
purpose in the experiment by bypassing the state 
explosion problem. Automated decomposition may be 
possible. In addition, only one interference scenario was 
verified in this experiment. With increased semantic 
understanding of the advanced electric power grid, more 
interference scenarios can be represented as assertions 
and integrated with the existing models.  
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